巴菲特答股东问3(银行业3)- 下篇

2018年6月21日11:50:47 发表评论 171 阅读

来源: 巴菲特答股东问3(银行业3)- 下篇 (由于字数限制,只能分成两篇发布。上篇包括2014-2016年间的问答,下篇包括2017年后的问答)– 雪球




(21) Audience: Question about Berkshire’s investment in Bank of America, its Tier 1 capital, its preferred stock held by Berkshire, and its recent accounting error. 【2014】

Q48: Station 5, Wisconsin. I am hoping that you will make us money. Never would you cheat us out of our money. In investment banking business confidence has fallen. Distressing reports in NYT about private meetings in the Justice Department and Fed about need or desire to bring criminal charges against largest banks, laundering billions of Iranian dollars. Do you believe a financial crisis will occur as a result of criminal activity or is it being institutionalized?【2014】


783—-DERIVATIVES Q– How do you analyze and value companies like Bank of America and Merrill Lynch and other commercial banks that Berkshire has investments in relative to their derivative exposures. 【2016】


Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk? 【2017】

Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?【2017】

Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”【2018】

Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk? 【2017】



Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk?


Warren Buffett: We at Berkshire probably – we certainly operate on a more decentralized plan than any company remotely our size. We count very heavily on principles of behavior rather than rules. That’s one reason at every annual meeting you see the Salomon clip in the movie. That’s why I write very few communiques to our managers. I send them one once every two years that basically says that we’ve got all the money we need. We’d like to have more, but it’s not a necessity. We don’t have one ounce more of reputation than we need, and that our reputation at Berkshire is in their hands. Charlie and I believe if you establish the right sort of culture, and that culture to some extent self-selects who you hire as directors and managers, that you will get better results that way in terms of behavior than a thousand-page guidebook. You’re going to have problems regardless. We have 367,000 employees. You have a town with 367,000 households, which is what the Omaha metropolitan area is, people are doing something wrong as we talk here today. The real question is whether the managers are thinking about finding and correcting any bad behavior, and whether if they fail in that, whether the message gets to Omaha and whether we do something about it.

巴菲特:在伯克希尔,我们显然在运营管理上甚至比体量远小于我们的公司还要更去中心化。我们更加依赖于(管理层的)行为准则而不是规定。这就是每年年会我们都要播放所罗门危机事件视频【注释1】的原因,这也是为什么我很少给我们(子公司的)管理层写指导报告。我大概每两年会给他们发一个通告,基本上就是告诉他们伯克希尔有足够的资金满足他们的需求。我们也可以进行更多的沟通,,但这并不必要。 伯克希尔不堪承受任何声誉上的损失,而我们的声誉和这些(子公司的)管理者们息息相关。查理和我相信建立正确的企业文化比一千页的规章制度更有效,这种文化在一定程度上能自我选择公司雇用什么样的管理层。(但是)不管怎样你总会遇到问题。伯克希尔有36.7万名员工,如果(把伯克希尔设想成)一个有36.7万位居民的城镇,规模类似于奥马哈大城区,那么总会有人在做一些错事。真正重要的问题是,管理者是否努力发现并纠正任何错误行为,他们在这方面做得是否成功,这些信息有没有传递给我们,我们是否需要采取什么措施。

At Wells Fargo there were three very significant mistakes. There was one that dwarfs all the others. You’re going to have incentive systems at almost any business. There’s nothing wrong with incentive systems. You have to be very careful about what you incentivize. You can’t incentivize bad behavior. If so, you better have a system for recognizing it. Clearly, at Wells Fargo there was an incentive system built around the idea of cross-selling a number of services per customer, and the company in every quarterly investor presentation highlighted how many services per customer. It was the focus of the organization – a major focus – and undoubtedly people got paid and promoted based on that number, at least partly based on that number. It turned out that was incentivizing the wrong kind of behavior.

富国银行犯了三个非常大的错误,其中一个错误又远远比其他两个严重得多(这个错误是不正确的激励机制)。经营任何生意都需要有激励机制,所以激励机制本身不是错误。(但是)你必须小心考虑激励机制会导致什么样的行为。你的激励机制不应该导致不良行为滋生,(所以)你最好有一套可以发现不良行为的(内控)系统。 很显然,富国银行有一套为每个客户提供交叉销售【注释2】的激励机制,公司在每一季度的投资者报告上都强调平均每个客户使用的服务种类。这是公司最为看重的指标,毫无疑问,员工的报酬和升迁都会基于这个数字,或者说至少部分基于这个数字。 现在看起来这个激励机制导致了不良行为(开设虚假账户)。

We’ve made mistakes. Any company is going to make mistakes in designing a system. You’re going to find out about it at some point. I will get to how we find out about it. I don’t know all of the facts of how the information got passed up the line at Wells Fargo. At some point if there’s a major problem, the CEO will get wind of it. At that moment, that’s the key to everything because the CEO has to act. That Salomon situation that you saw happened because on -I think April 28, the CEO of Salomon, the President of Salomon, the general counsel of Salomon, sat in a room, and they had described to them by a fellow named John Meriwether some terrible practice that was being conducted by a fellow named Paul Mozer who worked for them. Paul Mozer was flimflamming the US Treasury, which is a very dumb thing to do. He was doing it partly out of spite. He didn’t like the Treasury, and they didn’t like him. He put in phony bids for US Treasuries and all of that.

我们也犯过错误。任何公司在设计体系的时候都会犯错误,你迟早会发现(这些错误)。我要来谈谈我们如何发现它。我不知道在富国银行的内部汇报体系是怎么样的,(但是)如果存在重大问题,CEO迟早会在某个时候收到风声。 此时,最重要的是CEO必须采取措施。当时发生在所罗门兄弟【注释1】的情况是(巴菲特用所罗门危机事件说明企业应该如何处理重大危机):(1991年)4月28日,所罗门CEO,总裁,首席法律顾问坐在一起,一个叫John Meriwether的员工向他们报告了Paul Mozer这名雇员所做的一些极端恶劣的事情。Paul欺骗了美国财政部,这是个非常愚蠢的行为。他这样做一部分是为了泄愤。他不喜欢财政部的人,财政部的人也不喜欢他。Paul全部使用虚假标书买进政府债券。

On roughly April 28, the CEO and all these people knew they had something that had gone very wrong, and they had to report it to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The CEO said he would do it, and then he didn’t do it, and he undoubtedly put it off just because it was an unpleasant thing to do. On May 15, another Treasury auction was held, and Paul Mozer put in a bunch of phony bids again. At this point, it’s all over because top management knew that the pyromaniac had lit another fire, and he lit it after they had been warned he was a pyromaniac. It all went downhill from there. Bad behavior has to stop when the CEO learns about it.


Then they made a third mistake – again, it pales in comparison to the second mistake. They made the third mistake when they totally underestimated the impact of what they had done once it became uncovered. There was a $185 million penalty. In the banking business, people get fined billions and billions for mortgage practices and all kinds of things. The total fines, $30 or $40 billion, whatever the number would be. They measured the seriousness of the problem by the dimensions of the fine – they felt a $185 million fine signaled a less offensive practice than something that involved $2 billion, and they were totally wrong on that. The main problem is they didn’t act when they learned about it. It’s bad enough having a bad system, but they didn’t act.


At Berkshire, the main source of information for me about anything that’s being done wrong at a subsidiary is the hotline. We get 4,000 or so communications on the hotline a year, and most of them are frivolous-the guy next to me has bad breath or something like that. There are a few serious ones, and our internal audit team looks at them. A lot of them come in anonymous, probably most of them, some of them Becky (the internal auditor) refers back to the companies, probably most of them, but anything that looks serious, I will hear about that. That has led to action more than once. We spend real money investigating some of those. It has uncovered certain practices that we would not at all condone at the parent company. It’s a good system. I don’t think it’s perfect. I’m sure they have an internal audit and hotline at Wells Fargo. I don’t know the facts, but I would bet a lot of communications came in on that. I don’t know who did what at any given time. It was a huge, huge, huge error if they were getting – and I’m sure they were – some communications, and they ignored them or sent them back to somebody down below. Charlie, what are your thoughts on it?

在伯克希尔,举报热线是我获得任何下属公司潜在错误行为的主要途径。我们每年通过热线收集大约4000个举报,大部分的举报都没有什么价值,比如投诉我旁边那个小子有口气。但有一些举报是非常重要的,我们的内部审计团队会跟进调查。绝大多数都是匿名举报,Becky(内部审计师)会将绝大多数(不重要的)举报转给相应的子公司,但是我会关注那些看上去后果严重的举报。根据这些举报我们不只一次的采取了措施。我们花费巨大去调查其中的一些。调查发现的一些行为是我们伯克希尔决不能容忍的。我不认为现有的反馈机制是完美的,但应该还不错。 我相信富国银行有内部审计和举报热线。我不知道细节,但我敢打赌通过内部审计和热线会得到很多信息。 我不知道谁在什么时间做了什么。(开设虚假账户)是个极其严重的错误,我相信富国银行的管理层应该知道一些信息,只是他们选择忽略或者交给下级去处理。查理,你怎么看?

Charlie Munger: Put me down as skeptical when some law firm thinks they know how to fix something like this. If you’re in a business, where you have a whole lot of people, it’s very likely to cause a lot of misbehavior. Of course, you have a compliance department. Every stock brokerage firm has a huge compliance department. If we had one, we would have a big compliance department, also, wouldn’t we, Warren?


Warren Buffett: Absolutely.


Charlie Munger: It doesn’t mean everyone should solve their problems by having more compliance. We’ve had less trouble over the years by being careful of whom we picked to have power and having a culture of trust. I think we have less trouble, not more.


Warren Buffett: But we will have trouble from time to time.


Charlie Munger: Of course, we will be blindsided some day.


Warren Buffett: Charlie says an ounce of prevention – when Ben Franklin, whom he worships, said an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, he understated it. An ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. I’d say a pound of cure promptly applied is worth a ton of cure that’s delayed. Problems don’t go away. Salomon’s John Gutfreund said that problem – originally he called it a traffic ticket. It almost brought down the business. Some other CEO described a problem he encountered as a foot fault. It resulted in incredible damage to the institution. You have to act promptly.

巴菲特:查理引用过他的偶像本杰明.富兰克林的一句话“一分预防等于十分(事后)补救” 。我觉得富兰克林说得还有些保守。一分预防远胜十分补救。另外,十分及时的补救等于万分延迟的补救。问题不会自行消失。所罗门兄弟的John Gutfreund (1991年时任CEO)提及危机事件时,最初仅将事件定性为“交通罚单”(比喻事情很小,不值一提),这种行为(面对危机毫无作为)几乎整垮了公司。另外一些公司的CEO喜欢将危机事件描述为脚误(脚误就是指网球发球时踩线失误,与交通罚单类似,都是形容事情不严重)。这给公司造成了极大的损害,你必须及时采取行动。

Frankly, I don’t know any better system than hotlines and anonymous letters to me. I’ve gotten three or four of them probably in the last six or seven years that resulted in major changes. Very occasionally, they are signed. They are almost always anonymous. It wouldn’t make any difference because there will be no retribution against anybody obviously if they call our attention to something that is going wrong. I’m telling you as we sit here, someone is probably doing something wrong at Berkshire, and usually it’s very limited, maybe stealing small amounts of money or something like that. When it gets to some sales practice like was taking place at Wells Fargo, you can see the kind of damage it would do.








Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?【2017】

翻译: Tiger虎

校对: aierer

Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?


Warren Buffett: When the price of the stock is above $7 a share, which seems quite likely, whether we were going to keep it or not, it would certainly make sense to exercise the warrant shortly before it expired. It’s only a valuable warrant if it’s exercised and exchanged into common and that warrant does expire.


As I put in the annual report, our income from the investment would increase if Bank of America ever got to where it was paying 11 cents per share in quarterly dividends – as we get $300 million a year off the preferred, and for us to use the preferred as payment in exercise of the warrant, we would want to feel we were getting more than $300 million a year. They may or may not get to where they pay that amount before the warrant expires in 2021.


If it does get to there, we will exercise the warrant and instead of owning the 5 million of preferred and the warrants, we will have 700 million plus shares of common. That becomes a separate decision, do we want to keep the 700 million shares of common? {减法君:这个换算需要再澄清一下,50亿价值的优先股是确定的,如果转化价是7元,那正好是7亿股}If it were to happen today, I would definitely want to keep the stock. Who knows what other alternatives may be available in 2021, but if our warrants were expiring tomorrow, we would use the preferred to buy the $700 million plus shares of common, and we would keep the common. If it gets to an 11 cent quarterly dividend, we will convert it and very likely keep the common. {这段有点重复}If we get to 2021, if the common is above $7, which I certainly anticipate, we will exercise the warrant. I wish you success on your other objective. And I think probably the fellow will be using very good judgment, too.

如果股息确实恢复到了每季度11美分,我们将会(立即)行权,这样我们会拥有7亿股普通股而不是500万股优先股和权证。是否想要继续持有7亿股普通股将是另一个决定。 假如(股息恢复到每季度11美分)发生在今天,我(行权后)肯定会继续持有股票。谁也不知道2021年是否可能有其他替代品。但如果我们的权证明天到期的话,我们将使用优先股去购买7亿股的普通股,我们将持有这些普通股。 如果季度分红达到11美分,我们会转换它,而且很可能保持这些普通股。 如果到2021年,普通股价格高于7美元(行权价),我当然是这么预期,我们将行权。 我祝你在其他目标上取得成功。 我想很可能这个人(你未来的那一半)也会有很好的判断力。

Charlie Munger: I think it’s a very wise thing for a woman that owns Berkshire stock and is a good-looking woman to put her picture up like that for eligible bachelors. 


Warren Buffett: We might actually start selling ads in the annual report. Incidentally, that BOA purchase, it’s literally true that I was sitting in the bathtub when I got the idea whether they would be interested in the preferred. I spent a lot of time in the bathtub since and nothing has come to me. Clearly, I either need a new bathtub or we have to get into a different kind of market.



Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”【2018】

行业: Financials

细分行业: Banking

公司: WFC

翻译: Tiger虎

校对: aierer

10. Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”




ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Hi Warren. This question comes from Paul Spieker (PH) of Chicago, Illinois. I believe he may be here today.

Andrew:你好,沃伦,这个问题来自芝加哥的Paul Spieker,今天他可能也在现场。

He writes, “One of your more famous and perhaps most insightful quotes goes as follows:

″’Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.’


“In light of the unauthorized accounting scandal at Wells Fargo, of its admission that it charged customers for duplicate auto insurance, of its admissions that it wrongly fined mortgage holders in relation to missing deadlines caused by delays that were its own fault, of its admission that it charged some customers improper fees to lock in mortgage interest rates, of the sanction placed upon it by the Federal Reserve prohibiting it from growing its balance sheet, and of the more than recent $1 billion penalty leveled by federal regulators for the aforementioned misbehavior, if Wells Fargo company is a chronically leaking boat, at what magnitude of leakage would Berkshire consider changing vessels?”


WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Wells Fargo (Applause) –

Wells Fargo is a company that proved the efficacy of incentives, and it’s just that they had the wrong incentives. And that was bad.

But then they committed a much greater error – and I don’t know exactly how or who did it or when, but – ignoring the fact that they had a faulty incentive system which was incenting people to do things that were kind of crazy, like opening nonexistent accounts, et cetera.

巴菲特:好吧,又是富国银行。 富国银行这家公司证明了激励机制的效果,只不过他们激励有问题。这很糟糕。


And, you know, that is a cardinal sin at Berkshire. We know people are doing something wrong, right as we sit here, at Berkshire.

You can’t have 377,000 employees and expect that everyone is behaving like Ben Franklin or something out there. They – we – I don’t know whether there are ten things being done wrong as we speak, or 20, or 50.

The important thing is, we don’t want to incent any of that if we can avoid it, and if we find – when we find it’s going on, we have to do something about it. And that is absolutely the key to it.


And Wells Fargo didn’t do it, but Salomon didn’t do it. And the truth is, we’ve made a couple of our greatest investments where people have made similar errors.

We bought our American Express stock – that was the best investment I ever made in my partnership years – we bought our American Express stock in 1964 because somebody was incented to do the wrong thing in something called the American Express Field Warehousing Company. We bought –

A very substantial amount of GEICO we bought that became half the – half of GEICO, for $40 million because somebody was incented to meet Wall Street estimates of earnings and growth. And they didn’t focus on having the proper reserves.



A very substantial amount of GEICO we bought that became half the – half of GEICO, for $40 million because somebody was incented to meet Wall Street estimates of earnings and growth. And they didn’t focus on having the proper reserves.

And that caused a lot of pain at American Express in 1964. It caused a lot of pain at GEICO in 1976. It caused a layoff of a significant portion of the workforce, all kinds of things. But they cleaned it up.



They cleaned it up, and look where American Express has moved since that time. Look at where GEICO has moved since that time. So the fact that you are going to have problems at some very large institutions is not unique. In fact, almost every bank has – all the big banks have had troubles of one sort or another.

And I see no reason why Wells Fargo as a company, from both an investment standpoint and a moral standpoint going forward, is in any way inferior to the other big banks with which it competes on –



It – they made a big mistake. It cost – I mean, we still got – I mean we have a large, unrealized gain in it, but that doesn’t have anything to do with our decision-making. But the –


I like it as an investment. I like Tim Sloan as a manager, you know, and he is correcting mistakes made by other people.

I tried to correct mistakes at Salomon, and I had terrific help from Deryck Maughan as well as a number of the people at Munger, Tolles. And I mean, that is going to happen. You try to minimize it.

我喜欢这个投资。Tim Sloan (富国银行的新任CEO)是个好的管理者,他正在纠正别人犯的错误。

在所罗门兄弟公司的时候我曾经努力去纠正错误,我得到了Deryck Maughan和Munger, Tolles公司(在所罗门时,巴菲特请得律师事务所)的很多人的大力帮助。我是说,错误总会发生。你要做的是把错误最小化。

Charlie says that, “An ounce of prevention isn’t worth a pound of cure, it’s worth about a ton of cure.” And we ought to jump on everything. He’s pushed me all my life to make sure that I attack unpleasant problems that surface. And that’s sometimes not easy to do when everything else is going fine.


And at Wells, they clearly – and I don’t know exactly what – but they did what people at every organization have sometimes done, but it got accentuated to an extreme point.

But I see no reason to think that Wells Fargo, going forward, is other than a very, very large, well-run bank that had an episode in its history it wished it didn’t have.

But GEICO came out stronger, American Express came out stronger. The question is what you do when you find the problems.





CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. I think Wells Fargo is going to be better going forward than it would have been if these leaks had never been discovered.

WARREN BUFFETT: Or happened.



CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so I think it’s – it – but I think Harvey Weinstein has done a lot for improving behavior, too. (Laughter)

It was clearly an error, and they’re acutely aware of it and acutely embarrassed, and they don’t want to have it happen again.

You know, if I had to say which bank is more likely to behave the best in the future, it might be Wells Fargo, of all of them.

芒格:是的。我觉得。。。不过Harvey Weinstein也在做了很多改善工作。 (附注1)

发生在富国银行的很显然是个错误, 他们强烈地认识到这点,为此颜面扫地,他们不会让它再发生。


WARREN BUFFETT: This New York Times that I have here from March 12th, 1942, if you go toward the back of it, in the classified section, you have one big section that says, “Help Wanted Male,” and another one that says, “Help Wanted Female.”

You know, was the New York Times doing the right thing in those days? You know, I think the New York Times is a terrific paper. But people make mistakes.


And you know, the idea of classifying between – taking ads and saying, “Well, we’ll take them and divide them up between men and women, what jobs we think are appropriate,” or that the advertiser thinks is appropriate.


We do a lot of dumb things in this world. And GEICO, as I say, in the early 1970s, they just ignored – and you can do it in the setting of proper reserves, which mean they charged the wrong price to new customers because they thought their losses were less than they were. And I’m sure some of that may have been a desire to please Wall Street or just because they didn’t want to face how things were going. But it came out incredibly stronger. You know, and now it’s got 13 percent of the households in the United States insured.

我们在这个世界上总是会作很多傻事。像我所说,GEICO在上世纪七十年代初期没有保持合理的储备金,就是说它们对新客户收取的保费不合理,因为实际发生的保费损失比他们认为得要大。我相信部分原因可能是他们想取悦华尔街或者仅仅是他们不愿意面对事实。但是危机后的GEICO 变得很强大。GEICO保险现在覆盖了全国13%的参保家庭。

And it came out with an attention to reserves and that sort of thing that was heightened by the difficulties that they’d found themselves in where they almost went bankrupt. Forty-two –


CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lot more stupid than Wells Fargo. It was really stupid what they did way back, right?


WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They had the world by the tail, and then they quit looking at the reserve development. But – and American Express was just picking up a few dollars by having the field warehousing company in 1963. And, you know, they were worried whether it was going to sink the company.


And when some guy named Tino De Angelis in, I think it was Bayonne, New Jersey –

In fact, I went to the annual meeting in 1964 of American Express after the scandal developed, and somebody asked if the auditor would step forward.


And the auditor from one of the big firms, which I won’t mention, came up to the microphone, and somebody said, “How much did we pay you last year?”


And the auditor gave his answer, and then the questioner said, “Well, how much extra would you have charged us to go over to Bayonne, which was ten miles away, and check whether there’s any oil in the tanks?” (Laughs)


So it – you know, here was something – a tiny little operation – some guy was calling him from a bar in Bayonne and telling him this phony stuff was going on, and they didn’t want to hear it. They shut their ears to it.


And then what emerged was one great company after this kind of, what they thought was a near-death experience. So it’s – we’re going to make mistakes.


I will guarantee you that we will get some unpleasant news at Berkshire. I don’t know what it’ll be, you know – the most important thing is we do something about it.

And there have been times when I procrastinated, and Charlie has been the one that jabs me into action. And so he’s performed a lot of services you don’t know about. (Laughter)




附注2:色拉油丑闻. 1963年,商品交易商安吉里斯以豆油库存作为担保物,从银行借款。他把油罐底部注水,只在油罐口注入油,虚报了豆油库存。美国运通公司的一家子公司负责签发仓库收据,作为豆油库存量的依据。这种仓库收据可作为从银行贷款的抵押物,而美国运通的这家子公司变成了收据担保人。后来安吉里斯用借来的钱从事豆油期货投机,随后豆油价格崩溃,安吉里斯无法还款,导致给安吉里斯贷款的银行被迫破产,而美国运通的子公司需承担收据担保责任,美国运通因此股价暴跌。[引自《巴菲特投资案例》黄建平 著]

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