巴菲特答股东问3(银行业3)- 下篇

2018年6月21日11:50:47 发表评论 171 阅读

来源: 巴菲特答股东问3(银行业3)- 下篇 (由于字数限制,只能分成两篇发布。上篇包括2014-2016年间的问答,下篇包括2017年后的问答)– 雪球

(由于字数限制,只能分成两篇发布。上篇包括2014-2016年间的问答,下篇包括2017年后的问答)

上篇:https://xueqiu.com/6843906380/109197119

本周是银行业问答的第三期。包括2014年至今的问题,其中关于美国银行优先股和富国银行丑闻是大家提问的重点,按照年份先后顺序进行排列:

(21) Audience: Question about Berkshire’s investment in Bank of America, its Tier 1 capital, its preferred stock held by Berkshire, and its recent accounting error. 【2014】

Q48: Station 5, Wisconsin. I am hoping that you will make us money. Never would you cheat us out of our money. In investment banking business confidence has fallen. Distressing reports in NYT about private meetings in the Justice Department and Fed about need or desire to bring criminal charges against largest banks, laundering billions of Iranian dollars. Do you believe a financial crisis will occur as a result of criminal activity or is it being institutionalized?【2014】

IS BERKSHIRE TOO BIG TO FAIL? 【2015】

783—-DERIVATIVES Q– How do you analyze and value companies like Bank of America and Merrill Lynch and other commercial banks that Berkshire has investments in relative to their derivative exposures. 【2016】

792—–INVESTMENT BANKS AND WELLS FARGO【2016】

Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk? 【2017】

Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?【2017】

Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”【2018】

Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk? 【2017】

翻译:Tiger虎

校对:pkuhoop

Q. Wells Fargo is Berkshire’s largest holding. In the wake of the sales practices scandal, harsh findings noted that a major part of the company’s problem were due to its decentralized structure which gave too much autonomy to the bank’s leadership. How do you satisfy yourself Berkshire is not subject to the same risk?

富国银行是伯克希尔最大的持仓。公司的虚假帐户丑闻发生后,调查发现问题的主要原因是(过度)去中心化使得各个分行的管理层有太多自主权。你如何保证伯克希尔避免这样的风险(过度去中心化)?

Warren Buffett: We at Berkshire probably – we certainly operate on a more decentralized plan than any company remotely our size. We count very heavily on principles of behavior rather than rules. That’s one reason at every annual meeting you see the Salomon clip in the movie. That’s why I write very few communiques to our managers. I send them one once every two years that basically says that we’ve got all the money we need. We’d like to have more, but it’s not a necessity. We don’t have one ounce more of reputation than we need, and that our reputation at Berkshire is in their hands. Charlie and I believe if you establish the right sort of culture, and that culture to some extent self-selects who you hire as directors and managers, that you will get better results that way in terms of behavior than a thousand-page guidebook. You’re going to have problems regardless. We have 367,000 employees. You have a town with 367,000 households, which is what the Omaha metropolitan area is, people are doing something wrong as we talk here today. The real question is whether the managers are thinking about finding and correcting any bad behavior, and whether if they fail in that, whether the message gets to Omaha and whether we do something about it.

巴菲特:在伯克希尔,我们显然在运营管理上甚至比体量远小于我们的公司还要更去中心化。我们更加依赖于(管理层的)行为准则而不是规定。这就是每年年会我们都要播放所罗门危机事件视频【注释1】的原因,这也是为什么我很少给我们(子公司的)管理层写指导报告。我大概每两年会给他们发一个通告,基本上就是告诉他们伯克希尔有足够的资金满足他们的需求。我们也可以进行更多的沟通,,但这并不必要。 伯克希尔不堪承受任何声誉上的损失,而我们的声誉和这些(子公司的)管理者们息息相关。查理和我相信建立正确的企业文化比一千页的规章制度更有效,这种文化在一定程度上能自我选择公司雇用什么样的管理层。(但是)不管怎样你总会遇到问题。伯克希尔有36.7万名员工,如果(把伯克希尔设想成)一个有36.7万位居民的城镇,规模类似于奥马哈大城区,那么总会有人在做一些错事。真正重要的问题是,管理者是否努力发现并纠正任何错误行为,他们在这方面做得是否成功,这些信息有没有传递给我们,我们是否需要采取什么措施。

At Wells Fargo there were three very significant mistakes. There was one that dwarfs all the others. You’re going to have incentive systems at almost any business. There’s nothing wrong with incentive systems. You have to be very careful about what you incentivize. You can’t incentivize bad behavior. If so, you better have a system for recognizing it. Clearly, at Wells Fargo there was an incentive system built around the idea of cross-selling a number of services per customer, and the company in every quarterly investor presentation highlighted how many services per customer. It was the focus of the organization – a major focus – and undoubtedly people got paid and promoted based on that number, at least partly based on that number. It turned out that was incentivizing the wrong kind of behavior.

富国银行犯了三个非常大的错误,其中一个错误又远远比其他两个严重得多(这个错误是不正确的激励机制)。经营任何生意都需要有激励机制,所以激励机制本身不是错误。(但是)你必须小心考虑激励机制会导致什么样的行为。你的激励机制不应该导致不良行为滋生,(所以)你最好有一套可以发现不良行为的(内控)系统。 很显然,富国银行有一套为每个客户提供交叉销售【注释2】的激励机制,公司在每一季度的投资者报告上都强调平均每个客户使用的服务种类。这是公司最为看重的指标,毫无疑问,员工的报酬和升迁都会基于这个数字,或者说至少部分基于这个数字。 现在看起来这个激励机制导致了不良行为(开设虚假账户)。

We’ve made mistakes. Any company is going to make mistakes in designing a system. You’re going to find out about it at some point. I will get to how we find out about it. I don’t know all of the facts of how the information got passed up the line at Wells Fargo. At some point if there’s a major problem, the CEO will get wind of it. At that moment, that’s the key to everything because the CEO has to act. That Salomon situation that you saw happened because on -I think April 28, the CEO of Salomon, the President of Salomon, the general counsel of Salomon, sat in a room, and they had described to them by a fellow named John Meriwether some terrible practice that was being conducted by a fellow named Paul Mozer who worked for them. Paul Mozer was flimflamming the US Treasury, which is a very dumb thing to do. He was doing it partly out of spite. He didn’t like the Treasury, and they didn’t like him. He put in phony bids for US Treasuries and all of that.

我们也犯过错误。任何公司在设计体系的时候都会犯错误,你迟早会发现(这些错误)。我要来谈谈我们如何发现它。我不知道在富国银行的内部汇报体系是怎么样的,(但是)如果存在重大问题,CEO迟早会在某个时候收到风声。 此时,最重要的是CEO必须采取措施。当时发生在所罗门兄弟【注释1】的情况是(巴菲特用所罗门危机事件说明企业应该如何处理重大危机):(1991年)4月28日,所罗门CEO,总裁,首席法律顾问坐在一起,一个叫John Meriwether的员工向他们报告了Paul Mozer这名雇员所做的一些极端恶劣的事情。Paul欺骗了美国财政部,这是个非常愚蠢的行为。他这样做一部分是为了泄愤。他不喜欢财政部的人,财政部的人也不喜欢他。Paul全部使用虚假标书买进政府债券。

On roughly April 28, the CEO and all these people knew they had something that had gone very wrong, and they had to report it to the Federal Reserve Bank in New York. The CEO said he would do it, and then he didn’t do it, and he undoubtedly put it off just because it was an unpleasant thing to do. On May 15, another Treasury auction was held, and Paul Mozer put in a bunch of phony bids again. At this point, it’s all over because top management knew that the pyromaniac had lit another fire, and he lit it after they had been warned he was a pyromaniac. It all went downhill from there. Bad behavior has to stop when the CEO learns about it.

(1991年)4月28日,CEO和所有这些人都意识到这是严重的错误,他们必须向纽约的联邦储蓄银行报告。CEO说他会解决这件事,但是他没有,他显然(拖延着)把事情放到一边因为这不是一件令人愉快让人想做的事情。在5月15号的另一轮政府债券招标中,Paul再次使用了虚假标书。此时一切都结束了(太晚了)因为最高管理层知道Paul这个混账再次犯错,并且是在他们已经被警告之后发生的。从那一刻起事情变得无可挽回(所罗门兄弟公司几近崩溃)。所以,当CEO知道不良行为时,他必须立刻进行制止。

Then they made a third mistake – again, it pales in comparison to the second mistake. They made the third mistake when they totally underestimated the impact of what they had done once it became uncovered. There was a $185 million penalty. In the banking business, people get fined billions and billions for mortgage practices and all kinds of things. The total fines, $30 or $40 billion, whatever the number would be. They measured the seriousness of the problem by the dimensions of the fine – they felt a $185 million fine signaled a less offensive practice than something that involved $2 billion, and they were totally wrong on that. The main problem is they didn’t act when they learned about it. It’s bad enough having a bad system, but they didn’t act.

(富国银行的)管理层接着又犯了第三个错误,令第二个错误相形见绌的愚蠢决定。在他们完全了解事情曝光对公司的影响时,他们还是犯了第三个错误。惩罚的代价是1.85亿美元。在银行业,人们会因为按揭或是任何其他(不良)行为被罚数以十亿计美元的金额。罚款总额可能达到300亿、400亿或者更多。他们(富国银行的管理层)通过罚款的金额来衡量问题的严重性——他们觉得1.85亿罚款说明事情的严重性远远小于那些20亿罚款的违规行为,他们在这点上完全想错了。最主要的问题是他们知情后毫无作为。一套无效的(内控)系统就已经足够糟糕,再加上管理层的知情不作为(就更糟糕)。

At Berkshire, the main source of information for me about anything that’s being done wrong at a subsidiary is the hotline. We get 4,000 or so communications on the hotline a year, and most of them are frivolous-the guy next to me has bad breath or something like that. There are a few serious ones, and our internal audit team looks at them. A lot of them come in anonymous, probably most of them, some of them Becky (the internal auditor) refers back to the companies, probably most of them, but anything that looks serious, I will hear about that. That has led to action more than once. We spend real money investigating some of those. It has uncovered certain practices that we would not at all condone at the parent company. It’s a good system. I don’t think it’s perfect. I’m sure they have an internal audit and hotline at Wells Fargo. I don’t know the facts, but I would bet a lot of communications came in on that. I don’t know who did what at any given time. It was a huge, huge, huge error if they were getting – and I’m sure they were – some communications, and they ignored them or sent them back to somebody down below. Charlie, what are your thoughts on it?

在伯克希尔,举报热线是我获得任何下属公司潜在错误行为的主要途径。我们每年通过热线收集大约4000个举报,大部分的举报都没有什么价值,比如投诉我旁边那个小子有口气。但有一些举报是非常重要的,我们的内部审计团队会跟进调查。绝大多数都是匿名举报,Becky(内部审计师)会将绝大多数(不重要的)举报转给相应的子公司,但是我会关注那些看上去后果严重的举报。根据这些举报我们不只一次的采取了措施。我们花费巨大去调查其中的一些。调查发现的一些行为是我们伯克希尔决不能容忍的。我不认为现有的反馈机制是完美的,但应该还不错。 我相信富国银行有内部审计和举报热线。我不知道细节,但我敢打赌通过内部审计和热线会得到很多信息。 我不知道谁在什么时间做了什么。(开设虚假账户)是个极其严重的错误,我相信富国银行的管理层应该知道一些信息,只是他们选择忽略或者交给下级去处理。查理,你怎么看?

Charlie Munger: Put me down as skeptical when some law firm thinks they know how to fix something like this. If you’re in a business, where you have a whole lot of people, it’s very likely to cause a lot of misbehavior. Of course, you have a compliance department. Every stock brokerage firm has a huge compliance department. If we had one, we would have a big compliance department, also, wouldn’t we, Warren?

芒格:如果有哪家律师事务所认为他们知道如何从根本上解决这种问题,我一定会表示怀疑。如果你经营一个公司,一个有很多员工的公司,就会了解非常可能发生很多不当行为和违规。当然了,你会成立合规部门。每一个股票经纪公司券商都有一个队伍庞大的合规部门。如果伯克希尔也设立一个的话,那将是一个很大的合规部门,你说是这样的吗,沃伦?

Warren Buffett: Absolutely.

巴菲特:绝对的(会是一个很大的合规部门)。

Charlie Munger: It doesn’t mean everyone should solve their problems by having more compliance. We’ve had less trouble over the years by being careful of whom we picked to have power and having a culture of trust. I think we have less trouble, not more.

芒格:但这不代表每个人都应该通过在合规上投入更多来解决问题。在过去这些年我们麻烦更少的原因是我们在挑选管理者上非常小心,并且我们有一个(互相)信赖的文化。我想我们因此有更少的而不是更多的麻烦。

Warren Buffett: But we will have trouble from time to time.

巴菲特:但我们也会时不时地有些麻烦。

Charlie Munger: Of course, we will be blindsided some day.

芒格:当然了,总有一天我们会措手不及的碰到些麻烦事。

Warren Buffett: Charlie says an ounce of prevention – when Ben Franklin, whom he worships, said an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure, he understated it. An ounce of prevention is worth more than a pound of cure. I’d say a pound of cure promptly applied is worth a ton of cure that’s delayed. Problems don’t go away. Salomon’s John Gutfreund said that problem – originally he called it a traffic ticket. It almost brought down the business. Some other CEO described a problem he encountered as a foot fault. It resulted in incredible damage to the institution. You have to act promptly.

巴菲特:查理引用过他的偶像本杰明.富兰克林的一句话“一分预防等于十分(事后)补救” 。我觉得富兰克林说得还有些保守。一分预防远胜十分补救。另外,十分及时的补救等于万分延迟的补救。问题不会自行消失。所罗门兄弟的John Gutfreund (1991年时任CEO)提及危机事件时,最初仅将事件定性为“交通罚单”(比喻事情很小,不值一提),这种行为(面对危机毫无作为)几乎整垮了公司。另外一些公司的CEO喜欢将危机事件描述为脚误(脚误就是指网球发球时踩线失误,与交通罚单类似,都是形容事情不严重)。这给公司造成了极大的损害,你必须及时采取行动。

Frankly, I don’t know any better system than hotlines and anonymous letters to me. I’ve gotten three or four of them probably in the last six or seven years that resulted in major changes. Very occasionally, they are signed. They are almost always anonymous. It wouldn’t make any difference because there will be no retribution against anybody obviously if they call our attention to something that is going wrong. I’m telling you as we sit here, someone is probably doing something wrong at Berkshire, and usually it’s very limited, maybe stealing small amounts of money or something like that. When it gets to some sales practice like was taking place at Wells Fargo, you can see the kind of damage it would do.

坦白的说,我不知道有什么方法比举报热线和匿名信更有效。在过去六,七年有三四次的举报热线或匿名信(为伯克希尔)带来了重大变革。署名的反馈或举报很少,它们几乎总是匿名的。这其实没有任何区别关系,因为当有人提醒我们注意不良行为时显然不会发生针对任何人他的报复。我现在坐在这里就可以告诉你们,在伯克希尔很可能正有人在做什么坏错事,通常(破坏)程度很小,可能是偷窃数额不大的钱或是类似的事情。但是当它是像富国银行的销售丑闻时,你能看到它对公司的伤害有多大。

【注释1】所罗门危机事件视频

每年伯克希尔股东大会开场时会播放一些混合剪辑的视频,,其中一段就是巴菲特参与所罗门兄弟公开调查时的证词(1991年,巴菲特投资的所罗门兄弟公司涉嫌违反监管,遭到公开调查,巴菲特不得不临危受命担任该公司的董事长与美国财政部交涉,最终解除了危机)。

所罗门兄弟曾经是美国著名投行,在80年代在房地产资产证券领域独领风骚,后来因为违标投标国债出现危机,1990年被旅行者集团收购。

【注释2】交叉销售

交叉销售,发现现有客户的多种需求,并通过满足其需求而实现销售多种相关服务或产品的营销方式。在该问答中,交叉销售指为同一客户提供多项金融服务。

时间:2017

Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?【2017】

翻译: Tiger虎

校对: aierer

Q. Noting that she had been a Berkshire shareholder since she was 15, she jokingly asked if they knew any eligible bachelors in New York. Then on to her real question. Can you comment on the Bank of America preferred stock and warrants, and when you would convert those into common shares?

一个女性股东说她从15岁开始持有伯克希尔的股票,她开玩笑的问他们(巴菲特和芒格)有没有合适的在纽约的单身可以介绍?然后她问了一个严肃的问题。你能谈论一下在美国银行优先股和权证上的投资吗?你会在什么时候将它们转换成普通股?

Warren Buffett: When the price of the stock is above $7 a share, which seems quite likely, whether we were going to keep it or not, it would certainly make sense to exercise the warrant shortly before it expired. It’s only a valuable warrant if it’s exercised and exchanged into common and that warrant does expire.

巴菲特:当(美国银行)的股价超过7元时,这很有可能,不管将来是否保留它,在快到期时将权证行权都是明智的。只有将权证行权并换成普通股,才能兑现权证的价值,否则权证到期后就没有任何价值了。(所以在2021年到期时,只要股价超过7元的行权价,巴菲特肯定会行使权证,以兑现权证价值)

As I put in the annual report, our income from the investment would increase if Bank of America ever got to where it was paying 11 cents per share in quarterly dividends – as we get $300 million a year off the preferred, and for us to use the preferred as payment in exercise of the warrant, we would want to feel we were getting more than $300 million a year. They may or may not get to where they pay that amount before the warrant expires in 2021.

就像我在年报里讲的,如果美国银行恢复到支付11美分的季度红利,伯克希尔从这笔投资中的收入就会增长(行使权证后)。我们每年从优先股获得3亿美元的股息,而行使权证后,每年(从普通股那里)得到的股息会多于3亿美元(优先股6%股息,总共约50亿,所以每年股息是3亿元。如果季度派息达到11美分,年息44美分,对应7元的行权价,股息率就会超过6%)。在2021年权证到期前,他们可能会也可能不会恢复到支付这个数额(每季度11美分)股息的地步。

If it does get to there, we will exercise the warrant and instead of owning the 5 million of preferred and the warrants, we will have 700 million plus shares of common. That becomes a separate decision, do we want to keep the 700 million shares of common? {减法君:这个换算需要再澄清一下,50亿价值的优先股是确定的,如果转化价是7元,那正好是7亿股}If it were to happen today, I would definitely want to keep the stock. Who knows what other alternatives may be available in 2021, but if our warrants were expiring tomorrow, we would use the preferred to buy the $700 million plus shares of common, and we would keep the common. If it gets to an 11 cent quarterly dividend, we will convert it and very likely keep the common. {这段有点重复}If we get to 2021, if the common is above $7, which I certainly anticipate, we will exercise the warrant. I wish you success on your other objective. And I think probably the fellow will be using very good judgment, too.

如果股息确实恢复到了每季度11美分,我们将会(立即)行权,这样我们会拥有7亿股普通股而不是500万股优先股和权证。是否想要继续持有7亿股普通股将是另一个决定。 假如(股息恢复到每季度11美分)发生在今天,我(行权后)肯定会继续持有股票。谁也不知道2021年是否可能有其他替代品。但如果我们的权证明天到期的话,我们将使用优先股去购买7亿股的普通股,我们将持有这些普通股。 如果季度分红达到11美分,我们会转换它,而且很可能保持这些普通股。 如果到2021年,普通股价格高于7美元(行权价),我当然是这么预期,我们将行权。 我祝你在其他目标上取得成功。 我想很可能这个人(你未来的那一半)也会有很好的判断力。

Charlie Munger: I think it’s a very wise thing for a woman that owns Berkshire stock and is a good-looking woman to put her picture up like that for eligible bachelors. 

芒格:我觉得对一个女性来说,拥有伯克希尔的股票是非常聪明的决定。一个漂亮的女人把她的照片这样举起来寻找合适的另一半是同样充满智慧的。

Warren Buffett: We might actually start selling ads in the annual report. Incidentally, that BOA purchase, it’s literally true that I was sitting in the bathtub when I got the idea whether they would be interested in the preferred. I spent a lot of time in the bathtub since and nothing has come to me. Clearly, I either need a new bathtub or we have to get into a different kind of market.

巴菲特:我们可能应该开始在年报上卖广告。顺便说一下,购买美国银行的想法确实是当我坐在浴缸里时想到的,我突然想他们是否会对优先股感兴趣。之后我又在浴缸里花了很多时间但是一无所获。很显然,我要么需要一个新的浴缸,要么我们需要进入一个不同的市场。

时间:2017

Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”【2018】

行业: Financials

细分行业: Banking

公司: WFC

翻译: Tiger虎

校对: aierer

10. Wells Fargo will emerge stronger after its “big mistake”

富国银行在“重大丑闻”后会强势回归

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Andrew?

巴菲特:Andrew,下一个问题?

ANDREW ROSS SORKIN: Hi Warren. This question comes from Paul Spieker (PH) of Chicago, Illinois. I believe he may be here today.

Andrew:你好,沃伦,这个问题来自芝加哥的Paul Spieker,今天他可能也在现场。

He writes, “One of your more famous and perhaps most insightful quotes goes as follows:

″’Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.’

他曾经写道:“你(巴菲特)最具洞察力的一句名言是,如果你发现自己在一艘长期漏水的船上,换一艘船很可能比努力修补漏洞更加有效。

“In light of the unauthorized accounting scandal at Wells Fargo, of its admission that it charged customers for duplicate auto insurance, of its admissions that it wrongly fined mortgage holders in relation to missing deadlines caused by delays that were its own fault, of its admission that it charged some customers improper fees to lock in mortgage interest rates, of the sanction placed upon it by the Federal Reserve prohibiting it from growing its balance sheet, and of the more than recent $1 billion penalty leveled by federal regulators for the aforementioned misbehavior, if Wells Fargo company is a chronically leaking boat, at what magnitude of leakage would Berkshire consider changing vessels?”

关于富国银行的丑闻(未经授权进行操作),富国银行已承认多项不当行为:它向客户重复收取汽车保险费用;它对逾期还款的抵押贷款人进行不当罚款,而逾期还款是由富国银行自身造成的;它对客户收取不合理的费用,以锁定抵押贷款利率。富国银行已经受到美联储制裁——禁止扩张资产负债表,并罚款十亿美元。如果富国银行是一艘长期漏水的船,那么等船漏到什么程度时,伯克希尔会考虑换船(卖掉股份)?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, Wells Fargo (Applause) –

Wells Fargo is a company that proved the efficacy of incentives, and it’s just that they had the wrong incentives. And that was bad.

But then they committed a much greater error – and I don’t know exactly how or who did it or when, but – ignoring the fact that they had a faulty incentive system which was incenting people to do things that were kind of crazy, like opening nonexistent accounts, et cetera.

巴菲特:好吧,又是富国银行。 富国银行这家公司证明了激励机制的效果,只不过他们激励有问题。这很糟糕。

但他们接着犯了一个更严重的错误——我不知道当时情形下有什么人做了什么样的决策——他们(竟然)对激励机制出现问题这一事实视而不见,而这项错误的激励机制诱导员工做出疯狂的事,比如开设虚假帐户等。

And, you know, that is a cardinal sin at Berkshire. We know people are doing something wrong, right as we sit here, at Berkshire.

You can’t have 377,000 employees and expect that everyone is behaving like Ben Franklin or something out there. They – we – I don’t know whether there are ten things being done wrong as we speak, or 20, or 50.

The important thing is, we don’t want to incent any of that if we can avoid it, and if we find – when we find it’s going on, we have to do something about it. And that is absolutely the key to it.

这在伯克希尔是大忌。我们知道就在此刻在伯克希尔就会有人在做一些错事。你不可能指望三十万七千名员工都是本杰明.弗兰克林(美利坚开国三杰之一,富兰克林不仅是一位优秀的科学家,而且还是一位杰出的社会活动家,芒格非常推崇的具有高尚品格的人)那样的谦谦君子。我不知道到底是10件,20还是50件错事。重要的是,我们会尽力去避免激励这些错误行为发生。而当问题发生时,我们必须采取措施。这才是关键所在。

And Wells Fargo didn’t do it, but Salomon didn’t do it. And the truth is, we’ve made a couple of our greatest investments where people have made similar errors.

We bought our American Express stock – that was the best investment I ever made in my partnership years – we bought our American Express stock in 1964 because somebody was incented to do the wrong thing in something called the American Express Field Warehousing Company. We bought –

A very substantial amount of GEICO we bought that became half the – half of GEICO, for $40 million because somebody was incented to meet Wall Street estimates of earnings and growth. And they didn’t focus on having the proper reserves.

富国银行没有这么做,当年的所罗门兄弟公司也没有这么做。事实上,人们犯的此类错误成就了我们的最成功的几项投资。

我们在1964年买入美国运通的股票,这是我在合伙公司那段时间最成功的投资。当时,美国运通仓储公司(美国运通的子公司)的员工在错误激励下做了错事。(导致美国运通股价大跌,巴菲特才可以低价大量买入美国运通)

A very substantial amount of GEICO we bought that became half the – half of GEICO, for $40 million because somebody was incented to meet Wall Street estimates of earnings and growth. And they didn’t focus on having the proper reserves.

And that caused a lot of pain at American Express in 1964. It caused a lot of pain at GEICO in 1976. It caused a layoff of a significant portion of the workforce, all kinds of things. But they cleaned it up.

我们(有机会)以4千万美金的价格买到GEICO一半的股权,是因为GEICO当时(上世纪70年代)的管理层过于在意华尔街的盈利和增长预测,而没有将重点放在(维持合理的)保险准备金上。

这些不良行为在1964年重创了美国运通,在1976年重创GEICO。它导致了大规模的裁员和其他一系列事情。但是管理层最终将公司彻底整顿好了。

They cleaned it up, and look where American Express has moved since that time. Look at where GEICO has moved since that time. So the fact that you are going to have problems at some very large institutions is not unique. In fact, almost every bank has – all the big banks have had troubles of one sort or another.

And I see no reason why Wells Fargo as a company, from both an investment standpoint and a moral standpoint going forward, is in any way inferior to the other big banks with which it competes on –

看看从整顿好到现在美国运通发展得多好。看看GEICO从那时到现在变化有多大。所以说一些很大的机构发生问题,这本身并不是不寻常的。实际上,几乎每个银行,可以说所有的大银行都有这样或那样的问题。

从投资和道德角度看,我不认为富国银行在任何一方面比和它竞争的其他大银行差。

It – they made a big mistake. It cost – I mean, we still got – I mean we have a large, unrealized gain in it, but that doesn’t have anything to do with our decision-making. But the –

富国银行犯了大错误。代价很大,我们在富国的投资仍有很大的浮盈,但是这不会影响我们的投资决定。

I like it as an investment. I like Tim Sloan as a manager, you know, and he is correcting mistakes made by other people.

I tried to correct mistakes at Salomon, and I had terrific help from Deryck Maughan as well as a number of the people at Munger, Tolles. And I mean, that is going to happen. You try to minimize it.

我喜欢这个投资。Tim Sloan (富国银行的新任CEO)是个好的管理者,他正在纠正别人犯的错误。

在所罗门兄弟公司的时候我曾经努力去纠正错误,我得到了Deryck Maughan和Munger, Tolles公司(在所罗门时,巴菲特请得律师事务所)的很多人的大力帮助。我是说,错误总会发生。你要做的是把错误最小化。

Charlie says that, “An ounce of prevention isn’t worth a pound of cure, it’s worth about a ton of cure.” And we ought to jump on everything. He’s pushed me all my life to make sure that I attack unpleasant problems that surface. And that’s sometimes not easy to do when everything else is going fine.

查理说,“一分预防胜过十分补救,它抵得上万分补救。”我们必须立刻行动。这辈子查理都在督促我,在不愉快的问题刚暴露时就去解决。有时候这并不容易,(尤其是)当其他一切都还好时。

And at Wells, they clearly – and I don’t know exactly what – but they did what people at every organization have sometimes done, but it got accentuated to an extreme point.

But I see no reason to think that Wells Fargo, going forward, is other than a very, very large, well-run bank that had an episode in its history it wished it didn’t have.

But GEICO came out stronger, American Express came out stronger. The question is what you do when you find the problems.

Charlie?

很显然,在富国银行发生的事是每个组织里都可能发生的,只不过在富国银行事情发展到极端严重的程度。从长远看,我认为富国银行会是一个规模庞大而且运营良好的银行,尽管在它历史上发生了这个本不希望发生的小插曲。

GEICO走出(困境后)后变得更强大,美国运通走出(困境)后变得更强大。问题在于,当你发现问题时会怎么做。

查理,有什么补充吗?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree with that. I think Wells Fargo is going to be better going forward than it would have been if these leaks had never been discovered.

WARREN BUFFETT: Or happened.

芒格:我同意你说的。我觉得富国银行会比这些漏洞从未被发现的情况下发展得更好。

巴菲特:或者说对富国银行来说发生这些事比不发生更好。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, so I think it’s – it – but I think Harvey Weinstein has done a lot for improving behavior, too. (Laughter)

It was clearly an error, and they’re acutely aware of it and acutely embarrassed, and they don’t want to have it happen again.

You know, if I had to say which bank is more likely to behave the best in the future, it might be Wells Fargo, of all of them.

芒格:是的。我觉得。。。不过Harvey Weinstein也在做了很多改善工作。 (附注1)

发生在富国银行的很显然是个错误, 他们强烈地认识到这点,为此颜面扫地,他们不会让它再发生。

如果我必须预测将来会是哪家银行表现最好,那可能是富国银行。

WARREN BUFFETT: This New York Times that I have here from March 12th, 1942, if you go toward the back of it, in the classified section, you have one big section that says, “Help Wanted Male,” and another one that says, “Help Wanted Female.”

You know, was the New York Times doing the right thing in those days? You know, I think the New York Times is a terrific paper. But people make mistakes.

巴菲特:我这里是一份1942年3月12日的纽约时报,如果你翻到后面的分类广告部分,会看到一大块广告写道“招聘男员工”,另一个写着“招聘女员工”。你说,纽约时报在那个年代做的事是对的吗?我觉得纽约时报是个非常好的报纸。但是,人是会犯错误的。

And you know, the idea of classifying between – taking ads and saying, “Well, we’ll take them and divide them up between men and women, what jobs we think are appropriate,” or that the advertiser thinks is appropriate.

比如说分类,拿广告来说,“嗯,根据我们自己认为这些工作适合男性还是女性,把这些招工广告按性别分类”,或者根据广告商认为合适的方式。

We do a lot of dumb things in this world. And GEICO, as I say, in the early 1970s, they just ignored – and you can do it in the setting of proper reserves, which mean they charged the wrong price to new customers because they thought their losses were less than they were. And I’m sure some of that may have been a desire to please Wall Street or just because they didn’t want to face how things were going. But it came out incredibly stronger. You know, and now it’s got 13 percent of the households in the United States insured.

我们在这个世界上总是会作很多傻事。像我所说,GEICO在上世纪七十年代初期没有保持合理的储备金,就是说它们对新客户收取的保费不合理,因为实际发生的保费损失比他们认为得要大。我相信部分原因可能是他们想取悦华尔街或者仅仅是他们不愿意面对事实。但是危机后的GEICO 变得很强大。GEICO保险现在覆盖了全国13%的参保家庭。

And it came out with an attention to reserves and that sort of thing that was heightened by the difficulties that they’d found themselves in where they almost went bankrupt. Forty-two –

危机之后,GEICO开始更关注准备金,以及导致他们几乎破产的困难所凸现出的一些事。

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lot more stupid than Wells Fargo. It was really stupid what they did way back, right?

芒格:发生在GEICO的要比发生在富国的蠢得多。那真是太愚蠢了,不是吗?

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. They had the world by the tail, and then they quit looking at the reserve development. But – and American Express was just picking up a few dollars by having the field warehousing company in 1963. And, you know, they were worried whether it was going to sink the company.

巴菲特:是的。他们春风得意觉得一切尽在掌握,于是他们不再关注准备金的状况。而美国运通那次,仓储公司导致的危机实际上给公司造成的损失只有每股几块钱,但是那时,很多人却在担心事件会毁了整个美国运通公司。

And when some guy named Tino De Angelis in, I think it was Bayonne, New Jersey –

In fact, I went to the annual meeting in 1964 of American Express after the scandal developed, and somebody asked if the auditor would step forward.

(这件事起因)是一个叫Angelis(安吉里斯)的家伙,我记得是在新泽西的巴约。丑闻发生后,我参加了美国运通1964年的年会,有人请审计员站出来。

And the auditor from one of the big firms, which I won’t mention, came up to the microphone, and somebody said, “How much did we pay you last year?”

来自一个大公司的审计员来到麦克风前,公司名字我就不说了,有人问道“我们(运通公司)去年付了你多少钱?”

And the auditor gave his answer, and then the questioner said, “Well, how much extra would you have charged us to go over to Bayonne, which was ten miles away, and check whether there’s any oil in the tanks?” (Laughs)

审计员回答了问题,提问题的人接着问:“那么,你还要再收我们多少钱才肯去仅10英里外的巴约查一下那些油桶里到底有没有油呢?”[附注2]

So it – you know, here was something – a tiny little operation – some guy was calling him from a bar in Bayonne and telling him this phony stuff was going on, and they didn’t want to hear it. They shut their ears to it.

你看,事情就是这样的,很小的一个操作,有人从巴约的一个酒吧里给他打电话告诉他有人在干这个骗人的把戏,他们却不想听。他们把自己的耳朵闭上了。

And then what emerged was one great company after this kind of, what they thought was a near-death experience. So it’s – we’re going to make mistakes.

在这个被他们认为是一个几乎致命的事件后,美国运通成长为一个伟大的公司。所以说,我们都会犯错误的。

I will guarantee you that we will get some unpleasant news at Berkshire. I don’t know what it’ll be, you know – the most important thing is we do something about it.

And there have been times when I procrastinated, and Charlie has been the one that jabs me into action. And so he’s performed a lot of services you don’t know about. (Laughter)

我相信伯克希尔也会碰到坏消息。我不知道会是什么,但是最重要的是我们采取行动去应对它。

每次当我拖延的时候,是查理督促我采取行动。他为伯克希尔提供了很多你们不知道的服务。

附注1:好莱坞大佬,17年爆出性侵案。

附注2:色拉油丑闻. 1963年,商品交易商安吉里斯以豆油库存作为担保物,从银行借款。他把油罐底部注水,只在油罐口注入油,虚报了豆油库存。美国运通公司的一家子公司负责签发仓库收据,作为豆油库存量的依据。这种仓库收据可作为从银行贷款的抵押物,而美国运通的这家子公司变成了收据担保人。后来安吉里斯用借来的钱从事豆油期货投机,随后豆油价格崩溃,安吉里斯无法还款,导致给安吉里斯贷款的银行被迫破产,而美国运通的子公司需承担收据担保责任,美国运通因此股价暴跌。[引自《巴菲特投资案例》黄建平 著]

$伯克希尔-哈撒韦A(BRK.A)$ $道琼斯指数(.DJI)$

@今日话题 @unite_zhao @剁手专员 @zzz8zzz @aierer @Tiger虎 @pkuhoop @OCDW 

作者:减法君
链接:https://xueqiu.com/6843906380/109197130
来源:雪球

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